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Return on capital in the european fishery industry
C. Taal, LEI-DLO, The Netherlands
Abstract
This paper considers the level of Return on Capital of fishing vessels in Denmark, France,
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and an analysation of factors that influence this
Return on Capital.
Samples of costs and earnings of fishing vessels in these four countries have been the
basis for this profitability indicator.
Developments of the ROC are shown for the period 1991-1996. An analysation of
the impact of other factors, such as prices and innovative techniques, on the economic per-
formances and the profitability of the vessels is given.
This paper includes outcomes of inquiries among vessel owners, bankers and ac-
countants to assess the perception in the industry with respect to the economic performance
of fishing vessels.
Keywords: Economic performance/European fishery/Profitability indicator/Return
on Capital
1. Objective
The main objective of this study is to consider the level of Return on Capital (ROC) of
fishing vessels in Denmark, France , the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and to ana-
lyse factors influencing this return.
2. Introduction
This study has been carried out by four research institutes in: the Netherlands, France, the
United Kingdom and Denmark:
- LEI-DLO: Agricultural Economics Research Institute, Fisheries Division, The
Hague.
- ENSAR: Ecole Nationale Superieure Agronomique de Rennes, Dept. Halieutique,
Rennes.
- SFIA: Seafish Industry Authority, Fisheries Economics Research Unit, Edinburgh.
- SUC: Sydjysk Universitetcenter, Danish Institute of Fisheries Economics Research,
Esbjerg.
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The study has been carried out with financial assistance from the Commission of the
European Communities. The project was coordinated by W.P. Davidse from LEI-DLO.
3. Materials and methods
The information on the return on capital (ROC) and the costs and earnings in this study has
been based upon samples of fishing vessels in the four countries and covers the years
1991-1996.
The samples contain 365 vessels totally, representing fleets totalling some 1700 ves-
sels (1993).
Generally counts that the vessels in the several countries are of course fishing on dif-
ferent fishing grounds with different gear and on different species but they are comparable
with respect to length, GRT's or horse power. Furthermore, every country may have par-
ticular national management measures but all four countries are subject to the same
measures resulting from the Common Fisheries Policy. For example TAC's and technical
measures with respect to mesh sizes, closed areas etc.
An earlier study 'Costs and Earnings of fishing fleets in four EC countries' is used as
a basis for this study 'Return on Capital'. Costs and Earnings was focused on harmonisation
of the profit calculations in the four countries (Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom). The methodology of calculating the return on capital for all four coun-
tries is done in the same way.
The Danish sample concentrates on the port of Thyboron and contains trawlers, sein-
ers and gill netters. The French sample regards the ports of Concarneau, Lorient and Le
Guilvinec and covers the (semi) industrial fleet. Beam trawlers are the most important ves-
sels in the Dutch sample, but also shrimpers and multi purpose vessels are represented.
Scottish vessels form the main part of the UK sample. Demersal trawlers, seiners and
nephrop trawlers are included. Beam trawlers are represented in the English sample.
All amounts in this study are in ECU so that the level of costs and earnings can be
compared between the four countries.
Some costs need to be explained.
Labour, shares and wages
Costs of all labour is included. For the skipper-owner an imputed amount is calculated in
cases a salary is not paid to him. This imputed amount equals the share of a crew member.
A common depreciation system
Depreciation allowances are often a major component of a fishing vessel's financial ac-
counts. Different systems may lead to big differences in net results per vessel. Therefore
uniformity in this respect is very important to get comparable returns per vessel in the four
countries involved in this project. The basis of the system is the replacement value of the
vessel, this is the current building costs of a similar new vessel.
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The hull of the vessel is depreciated in 25 years, 4% per year on the basis of the re-
placement cost and after this period 2% of the replacement value is depreciated as an
estimate for improvements on these older vessels.
Engines with heavy use are depreciated in ten years, 10% per year and 4% after this
period. In case of more light use the depreciation period is 15 years, 6.7% per year and
2.5% after this period; all percentages based upon the replacement cost.
Interest
Interest costs per vessel will differ widely in practice due to differences in the level of
loans. To eliminate these differences an imputed interest has been calculated.
The basis for the calculation of the imputed interest is the nominal book value of the
vessel, which is derived from the previous mentioned replacement value and the deprecia-
tion system described above.
Gross cash flow
This is the residual balance after the deduction of all operating expenditures from gross
earnings. This indicator shows the amount available for interest payments and repayment
of loans.
The key-indicator in this study is the Return on Capital (ROC). It is represented by a
percentage, resulting from the formula:
net profit + imputed interest x 100
insured value of the vessel
It should be kept in mind that the value of available fishing rights is not included in
this return on capital figure. This concerns mainly Dutch and UK fishing vessels, owning
more or less individualised fishing rights. The value of these rights is not included in the
insured value of the vessel so that this measure of the capital value might be a low estimate
in relevant cases. No costs of fishing rights (such as depreciation and interest) are included
in the total annual costs of the vessels.
4. Developments of the Return on Capital
Calculating a return on capital seems a useful measure since fishing is a rather capital in-
tensive activity. Though the indicator is hardly used in the industry, it is useful to compare
the economic performance of fleet segments and to identify economic trends in the fisher-
ies.
An adequate ROC requires a level of 8% or more, depending on the interest rate for
borrowings.
From this viewpoint, the ROC has been very low for the fleetsegments involved in
this study.
Only smaller Danish seiners and gill netters and some Dutch beamer groups show
this or a higher level of the ROC. This occured mainly in 1991 and 1992. On the whole the
Danish and Dutch vessel groups had the least worse level of ROC in the period 1991-1995
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Most of the UK and French vessel groups had a negative ROC in this period, whereby the
values of the French (semi)industrial vessels from Lorient seem to be disastrously low.
The avarage ROC per size group has developed differently in the period 1991-1995
in the four countries. The Danish trawlers improved their profitability in 1994/1995,
whereas a deterioration occured for the seiners and gill netters in these two years.
For the French (semi)industrial vessels the ROC indicates a low point in 1993 and
improvements for the trawlers of Guilvinec and Concarneau afterwards. The ROC de-
creased in most cases for the Dutch beam trawl groups after the relatively high level in
1991 and 1992.
The very low negative ROC of the British demersal fleet shows marginal improve-
ments in 1993.
In the case of Scottish samples estimated ROCs in 1995 are above the correspond-
ing levels in 1991-1994. There are also indications of a similar trend in the case of the
English beam trawlers.
In figure 1, the average ROC in 1995 for (smaller) vessels ( 50-125 GRT) is shown.
The outcomes vary between +7% and -4%.
In this case the investigated fleetsegments were; the Danish trawlers from Thyboron,
fishing for consumption and industry, the French 24 meter trawlers from Le Guilvinec, two
Dutch Eurocutter-groups and two groups of Scottish trawlers and seiners.
For the Danish vessels cod, plaice and sandeel are important. The French vessels de-
pend on valuable flatfish and nephrops and the Dutch vessels on sole and plaice. The
earnings of the two Scottish fleetsegments, with homeports Peterhead and Fraserburgh, de-
pend on the catch of cod and haddock.
Both Scottish groups had a distinctly negative ROC in 1995. The French vessels per-
formed as the best with a 7 percent ROC. As said before, ofcourse this is a comparison of
only one year. In other years the results can be completely different.
Remarkable is that there are big differences between the countries concerning the
earnings and costs. The French trawlers reached the highest earnings (593000 ECU). That
was about 70 percent higher than the Dutch Eurocutters with the lowest earnings (348000
ECU).However, the French trawlers were rather new and therefore also the costs (depre-
ciation and interest) were high.
The return on capital of bigger vessels (250-650 GRT) is shown in figure 2.
Results of the Danish trawlers from Thyboron, the French trawlers from Lorient, two
Dutch beamer-groups and beamers from the United Kingdom are reflected for the years
1995 and 1993.
Both Dutch beamer-groups appeared to be the most profitable of the investigated
vessels. The return on capital for the French trawlers was very bad.
5. The impact of public policies and other major factors on the return on capital
Analysis of the impact of different management measures on the profitability of the fleets
could provide valuable information.
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The following aspects have mainly influenced the ROC:
a. quota changes/catches of fish;
b. prices of fish;
c. decommissioning;
d. the horsepower licence scheme;
e. conservation measures;
f. innovations ( technical and organizational).
The decrease of cod quota in the period 1991-1993 has depressed the returns of the
Danish gill netters and the seiners. The cod price development could not compensate these
lower quota.
Quota increases of this specie brought the availability again at the 1991 level, but the
nominal cod price has decreased by nearly 30% for the period 1991-1995.
Plaice is most important for the Danish seiners and this quota decreased by 29 and
7% in 1995 and 1996, after a stable patern in 1991-1994. An investigation of the effect of
quota changes in 1996 on the ROC, through a vessel model, learns that mostly the gill net-
ters and the seiners show positive developments. The ROC could increase in 1996 from
4.9-10.4% for the gill netters and from a level of 4% to 6.5% for the seiners. The trawlers
are more sensitive to changes in abundance of 'reduction' fish. A 5% increase of this abun-
dance may increase the ROC for the largest trawlers from 4.3% in 1995 to 6.1% in 1996,
all else equal.
The Danish seiners and smaller trawlers decreased in number by more than 50% in
the period 1990-1995 by decommissioning. Decommissioning has had on one hand a sta-
tistical effect on the average ROC in that an imoprovement arises since the vessels with the
lowest ROC mostly have left the fleet. A decommissioning of e.g. 5% causes an increase
of the ROC of 0.2-0.3%. On the other hand, decommissioning has more impact on the
longer run since there is less competition between the remaining vessels for yhe quota spe-
cies.
Danish vessels are mostly very old and a less harder depreciation system than the
commom one in this study seems to be more suited for the Danish situation. Such a depre-
ciation which follows the decrease of the insured value, would higher the ROC by 2-4%
for rhe Danish vessels.
Major impacts on the decreasing ROCs of the French industrial fleet have been:
- the lower prices in the period 1991-1994, 20-30% for the most important species,
which seem to have the most important determinant of the ROC deterioration;
- quota changes for cod, saithe and anglerfish which species became less available in
the period 1991-1993 and had an upward trend afterwards. The doubling of the had-
dock quota in the period 1991-1996 meant a positive factor for the ROC of the
industrial vessels. A sensitivity analysis turned out that 5% quota increase of the
main species results in a ROC improvement, varying from 0.9-3.8%.
The more specialized 33 meter vessels of Lorient are most sensitive to such a quota
increase; A decommissioning of 33% in number of French industrial stern trawlers will
have an important positive structural effect on the profitability. The decommissioning of
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the vessels with the lowest ROC turned out to have a minor statistical effect on the average
ROC.
For the Dutch beam trawlers public policies have had the following impacts on the
ROC:
- decreases of the flatfish quotas have depressed the profitability of this fleet in 1995
and 1996. A sensitivity analysis for the most important size grop, 1101-1470 kW,
turned out that the lowe plaice and sole quotas in 1996 will lower the average ROC
of these vessels from 5.6% (1995) to 0.8%, all else equal. However, substantial in-
creases of the sole and plaice prices may improve this ROC again to 3.6%;
- decommissioning has removed some 90,000 kW from the cutter fleet, which has re-
sulted ion better catching possibilities for the remaining fleet. I has to be emphasized
that higher catches do not accrue for free to the operating vessels. The vessel owners
have to pay a high price for the ITQs, if they purchase them from other owners who
leave the fishery;
- the horsepower licence scheme, implemented in 1985, has stopped the investment
mechanism that resulted in capacity increases (10-20%) after profitable years. In
particular, this scheme has prevented such increases after the profitable years 1991
and 1992. Investments in ITQs even exeeded the investments in vessels in these
years.
The fuel price for the Dutch vessels came at such a higher level (some 50% com-
pared with 1995 average price) in the second half of 1996. Such a cost increase will have a
major impact on the profitability of the beamers. This means a cash flreduction by 75,
ECU on an annual basis for a larger beamer, whereas the ROC effect would contain a de-
crease from the expected 3.6% in 1996 to 1.8%, all else equal.
6. Perceptions in the industry on the return on capital
Interviews with vessel owners, accountants and staff members of banks have been held in
the four countries to:
- identify financial indicators that are used by vessel owners and to investigate if the
ROC is of importance in the industry;
- investigate if the applied methodology of calculating profits does result in financial
returns that correspond to out-turns as perceived by the industry itself;
- learn which factors are considered to have mainly affected the returns;
- investigate which have been the main technical innovations implemented by the in-
dustry over the survey period and thereafter.
Staff members from banks and accountants in Denmark concluded that:
- the ROC is theoretical relevant but they do not use this indicator. A problem is that
the invested capital is difficult to measure;
- the net profit and the ROC resulting from this study mean an underestimation of the
economic performance of the Danish vessels. In particular the depreciation costs ac-
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cording to the common methodology cause this difference with the perception of the
industry;
- the available fish quotas and the abundance of fish seem to have the major impor-
tance for the level of returns;
- the re-financing reform, implemented by the Danish government in 1993, positively
affected the return of the vessels;
Conclusions from the French interviews are that:
- the level of returns in this study correspond roughly with the perception in the indus-
try on profitability;
- a kind of ROC , a return on investment is annualy calculated by fishing companies.
Apart from this, numerous indicators are periodically used since the beginning of the
nineties;
- a major change has occured in the investments behaviour of the fishing companies in
that the policy of replacing a vessel every ten or fifteen years has stopped.
Vessel owners, staff members from banks and accountants have been interviewed in
The Netherlands. The main conclusions from the interviews are:
- the ROC indicator is not known under vessel owners and not used by accountants
and bankers;
- the perception of vessel owners, accountants and bankers on the returns are rather in
line with the outcomes in this study, wherby vessel owners seem to be somewhat
more positive than the other two types of respondents;
- the amount of weekly gross earnings is the main financial indicator for skipper own-
ers.
Beside that, a statement with a weekly survey of quota uptake is used as a supple-
ment.Behaviour off skipper owners is changing from hunters for fish towards managers of
quotas:
- returns of vessels are mainly influenced by quotas and prices. A new influencing
factor thereby include speculative decisions about leasing and hiring of ITQs. The
speculative element contains the moment of leasing/hiring (price differences over
time) and the quantity to lease/hire (uncertainties about catchability);
- a minority of the vessel owners had implemented innovations on board;
- vessel owners, accountants and bankers emphasized that a kind of freeze of the fleet
had arisen in the nineties as a result of all the regulations.
Conclusions from UK interviews are:
- the role of financial indicators is related with ownership structures. At one extreme
there are few public companies who maintain a sophisticated regime of financial
monitoring, including terget ROCs. At the other extreme there are large numbers of
individual fishermen have no idea of ROC as such and whose indicators are related
to cash flows;
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- banks do not use ROC. They seem to be content with cash flow projections in rela-
tion to investments;
- the perception in the industry with respect to gross earnings/cash flows has been
broadly in agreement with the trend indicated in this study;
- an interview with the most important British Insurance Company for fishing vessels
learned that there is a rather close relationship between the actual market value of a
vessel and its insured value, apart from time lags in adjustment of the latter one.
7. Conclusions and future work
1. Fishermen do not require an adequate reward for their labour since the ROC of the
vessel groups in the four countries is mostly (far) below the actual costs of capital.
2. A very low or even negative ROC does not suggest that the enterprise has to be
stopped within a short time. Owners of family enterprises, like most fishery firms
are, can continue their activities for a rather long time, consuming their depreciations
and accepting a low reward for their labour. Many farm holdings and fishery enter-
prices are an example of such a development. The consequence of this is that it may
be very difficult to reduce the fleets by imposing limiting measures.
3. Calculating a ROC is useful to:
- identify trends in the economic performance of fishing vessels;
- compare the profitability in the fishery sector with profitability levels in other sec-
tors;
- get more insight in the behaviour of fisherman.
This study provides detailed costs and earnings of fleet segments of four countries,
based on sample vessels. Some of the results have been used for one of the reports of the
STECF sub-group.
Continuation of studies on the economic performance of fleet segments is recom-
mendable and even necessary in view of the basic Regulation for Fisheries management
(REEC nr.3760/92).
This Return on Capital study has established a useful network for data collecting and
processing. Continuation can result in buildingstones for future issues of e.g. an Annual
Economic Report (AER).
A well developed data network in the EU fisheries countries is required when a rep-
resentative Annual Economic Report (AER) is to be established. In this respect, the EU
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), in operation in the agricultural sector already
for a long time , may serve as an example for future AERs.
Reference
Davidse, W.P. e.a., Return on capital in the European fishery industry. (LEI-DLO) 158,
September 1997.
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Integrated economic, social and ecological perspectives of
herring fishery in the southern baltic sea. Risks and chances
Ralf Döring, Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-University, Germany
Abstract
The German catch quota of the western herring stock of the Baltic Sea is under-exploited.
Only few fishermen, using trap nets and gill nets, catch herring in the spring-spawning sea-
son around the Island of Rügen (northeast Germany). Due to low prices for raw herring,
only the use of the passive methods with low running costs remain. With severe economic
problems because of low profits many fishermen retired and few new one started a fishing
carreer. The build up of a processing plant for herring should solve these problems and the
use of ecological friendly passive fishing methods can generate a sustainable fishery.
Key words: Sustainable fishery, Baltic Sea herring fishery, Fishing Sector Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern (Northeast Germany), Processing Industry
1. Introduction
In most regions of the world, fisheries are in a severe crisis. The stocks decline, many fish-
ermen got unemployed. In contrast the herring stock of the western baltic sea is in a very
good condition. One reason might be that German fishermen have using up to 15% of last
years quotas.
A new processing plant is to be built in Neu - Mukran (Rügen). Consequences of this
new plant for local fishermen and the sustainability of German fishery in the Baltic Sea are
discussed from an ecological and economical viewpoint.
2. The area
Being Germany's largest island, Rügen is a part of the German coast at the Baltic Sea. Sev-
eral fisheries have a long tradition, because the island is surrounded by shallow water areas
with brackish water. These waters are populated by specific fish communities including
fresh- and saltwater species. Some of them live there permanently, like pike, perch and
zander, others migrate seasonally. So the Greifswalder Bodden in the southeast is one of
the main spawning areas of the herring stock of the western part of the Baltic Sea.
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3. Characteristics of Bodden herring fishery
In a document about the Slavs from the 12th century, an extensive herring fishery is de-
scribed. In the following centuries many places along the coast were used as 'Vitten',
places where herring was salted. The people of Rügen used to be farmers and fishers. Only
very few were fulltime fishermen.
Traders have always had a strong position from the middle ages on. One of the main
reasons for the constitution of the „Hanse' was the right to trade herring in these region.
The strong position of the traders didn't change since the beginning of the 20th century.
Around 1920, the fishermen joined in cooperations to get a better position. After the sec-
ond world war all fishermen were forced to join one of the new fish production
cooperations, which were mainly engaged in marketing the fish. Technically most of the
fishermen remained independent and kept their own boats and equipment. The state guar-
anteed good prices and bought all of the landed fish. So the fishermen were well-off
economically.
Due to the bad economic situation at the beginning of the century, the fishermen had
no opportunity to buy big ships. They had to use the traditional fishing methods, trap nets,
longlines and gill nets. But these fishing methods have some positive effects:
- they operate selectivly and protect the marine ecosystems;
- the running costs are low.
At the end of the 80ies, the fishermen caught 50.000 t of herring a year (see also ta-
ble 1), of which 15% gill net herring and 21% trap net herring. The remaining 64% of the
quota of the GDR was used by trawlers (17 m -Ships).
Table 1 Herring Total Catch and Catch in the Greifswalder Bodden (source: Informationen über die
Fischwirtschaft des Auslandes, p. 50 and Ministry of Agriculture and Nature Conservation of
the Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MANC) , Report about Agriculture, different years).
Total Catch Catch Greifswalder
(till 1989 GDR, then Meckl.-Vorp.) Bodden
Year
in t in t
1984 49,554
1985 48,903
1986 51,149
1987 45,211
1990 45,038
1991 28,226 6,100
1992 9,338 7,890
1993 9,460 6,481
1994 10,026 6,126
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4. Present situation
After 1989 low prices for herring caused big economic problems for the fishermen (Table
2 for boats under 12m). Only 10 to 15% of the German herring quota of 100.000 t was
used during the last few years, and 88% out of it were fished with the traditonal, passive
fishing methods. Because of the lower running costs, only the user of these techniques
fished herring. The trawler used to catch cod and flounder.
A problem is, that the catch must be transported to Denmark for processing. The
fishermen have to pay 0,10 DM/kg for the transport, the price for raw herring at the mo-
ment is 0,42 DM/kg.
During the last eight years many of the old fishermen retired and very few young
people started a fishing carreer (see Table 3 for the job situation in the fishing sector). If
these situation doesn't change during the next years, very few fishermen will be in practice
within 10 or 20 years.
Table 2 Profits, Subsidies and Net Investment for Boats under 12m (see MANC, different years)
Year Profits (Boats under 12m) Subsidies Net Investment
1991                  12.166 DM          8.400 DM -        1.800 DM
1992                  16.496 DM          7.695 DM -           144 DM
1993                  12.857 DM         10.018 DM -        1.465 DM
1994                    9.510 DM          4.620 DM -           800 DM
2003* 35.000 DM
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Table 3  Job Situation in the Fishing Sector (see MANC, different years)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 2003
Fulltime Fishermen 1380 948 900 800 593 615 565 600
Parttime Fishermen 79 106 150
Other Employees 1817 1002 1000 300 300 220 200 400
Total 3197 1950 1900 1100 893 914 871 1150
0
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*) Expectation: Expansion of the passive fishing technics and the new processing plant.
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5. The new processing plant in Neu Mukran
At the moment it seems, a solution for the economic crisis is in sight. A new processing
plant for herring may be built in Neu-Mukran, a small village with a big ferry harbour.
With a capacity of 50.000 t, this plant can process half of the german catch quota. The
newest processing technology and an integrated fish oil and fish meal factory will be build
up. In contrast to the present situation, the catch will be transported over sea and only for
short distances over land - the investor hopes that the quality of the fish will be superior
closer to the catch areas. The German fishermen near the processing plant are supposed to
fish the herring - but it is not yet clear wether this is possible in the future.
6. Risks and chances for local fishermen
For me a development of a sustainable fishery seems necessary. This requires the govern-
ment's and the investor's readiness to preserve the traditional fishing methods. One of the
main demands of people involved in the discussion about the future of fisheries is that the
fish stocks have to be used near the coasts by means ecological friendly fishing techniques
(McGoodwin, J.R. (1990), p. 107). In this area this mean gill nets and trap nets.
Risks and chances for local fishermen.
Risks
- large investments in new boats and fishing equipment are necessary, so that the net-
and trap-fishermen can catch an adequate quantity of fish;
- parts of the german herring quota of 100.000 t can left to other states in the future,
providedd Germany's catches do not rise. As already mentioned, under-use of quotas
might however be responsible for the good herring stock (see figure 1);
- if that is so what happens;
- if the rest of the quota will be used; and;
- if the herring stock will be submitted to industrialized fishing for fish-meal and
oil in the future?
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Figure 1 Biomass of herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea (see Harbowy, J. (1996), p. 2119)
Chances
- the government could grant property rights on a share of the quota to fishermen using
passive fishing techniques which enables them to catch around 25.000 t in the future;
- the use of passive fishing techniques;
- guarantees/creates more jobs than the big ships;
- are ecologically sustainable (see to the question of destructive gear Berrill, M.
(1997), pp. 62 and Dahm, E. (1994), pp. 23);
- in the cod-fishery a very low stock is involving severe problems at the moment. Bet-
ter prices for herring might persuade owners of larger ships to catch herring instead
of cod. So, the rest of the 50.000 t could be caught by german fishermen;
- the remaining 50.000 t of the german catch quota should not be used but kept as a
buffer for a good herring stock in the future.
7. Conclusion
With the new processing industry for herring in Neu-Mukran there is a great chance for the
development of a sustainable fishery in the Baltic Sea. If it is possible to preserve tradi-
tional use systems with passive fishing methods, the ecological consequences for the
ecosystem and the stock are presumably not very severe. The most effective fishing tech-
niques destroyed a lot of big fish stocks and brought high unemployment to many regions
of the world (Canada's east coast e.g.). A buffer in the catch quotas can be expected to
mitigate adverse consequences on fish stocks, caused by the new processing plant. Perhaps
this can be a positive example for the use of a big pelagic fish stock in the future, I hope so.
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Sleeping in separate beds: a comparative analysis of the
economic and social sciences in their approach to fisheries
research
David Symes, University of Hull, United Kingdom
Introduction
In their original statement introducing the session on 'Economics within multi-disciplinary
research', the organisers stated that
- in fisheries-related research, marine biology has played a leading role for many dec-
ades. Economics has appeared gradually on the scene over the past 5 to 10 years
(EAFE). Other social sciences have manifested themselves even more recently
(ESSFiN);
- often a certain amount of antagonism exists between scientists who represent the es-
tablished fields and those who also feel that they have something worthwhile to
contribute but have to 'struggle' to receive some attention. There are many reasons
for such frictions: a threat to vested interests, lack of mutual appreciation, insuffi-
cient personal and professional contact, etc.'
A social scientist could take exception to this statement both in terms of its historical
inaccuracy - the interest of economic and social sciences in fisheries related research is far
older than the emergence of the two organisations referred to by their acronyms - and in
the positioning of the social sciences on the margin of applied research. Accordingly, the
social scientist might detect a touch of arrogance in this statement and, in line with this in-
terpretation, be tempted to locate both fisheries economics and fisheries science as
established and privileged elite players in the policy community. The social sciences may
prefer to be seen as mere bystanders, able to enjoy the game of fisheries management as
spectators and vociferous critics (Fig. 1), unburdened by any share in the responsibility for
the ensuing defeat. Or could it possibly be that this invitation to share in a moment of in-
trospection is prompted by the fact that the fisheries economists themselves feel somewhat
unnerved by recent attacks from social scientists directed at the palpably false assumptions
- shared with fisheries scientists - underlying the bio-economic model which have struc-
tured the approach to fisheries management over the past three decades (Smith, 1990;
Wilson and Kleban, 1992; Holm, 1996)? Is it even possible that fisheries economists them-
selves feel threatened with marginalisation as a result of past trends and future prospects?
Might we be witnessing the acting out of the parable of the prodigal son in which fisheries
economics, having enjoyed their misspent youth in the company of fisheries scientists, re-
turn chastened, wiser and repentant to their original home in the social sciences?
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Putting aside such waspish and unworthy thoughts, there clearly are some serious
questions facing the future development of research and expert advice on fisheries man-
agement and policy. These questions are in part engendered by the apparent failure of
existing management systems to achieve their primary objective of sustainable resource
development, in part stimulated by the growing awareness of a need to widen the scope of
management objectives to include a socio-cultural dimension, and in part precipitated by a
likely shifting of the goalposts in terms of the pressure to integrate fisheries management
within a more broadly structured framework of management for the marine ecosystem as a
whole (Svelle et al., 1997). This synoptic review of the current situation calls for a reap-
praisal of the roles of the economic and social sciences and of the relations between the
two in a multidisciplinary approach to fisheries management. The aims of this paper are
fourfold: first, to define the nature of the economic and social sciences; secondly, to distin-
guish their separate foci of interest and their contrasting approaches to regulation theory;
thirdly, to outline an agenda for social science research; and finally, to comment on the
scope for co-operation between the economic and social sciences in a multi-disciplinary
approach to problem solving in fisheries management.
Getting to know the contestants
The social sciences are a broad church - a loosely structured federation of cognate disci-
plines. As such it would be inappropriate to refer to fundamental schisms within the social
sciences, but there have been some significant breakaway sects - including both economics
and law - leaving behind a more or less coherent body of 'softer' social sciences which
share a common agenda of research interests in the realm of fisheries management. There
is, however, a danger of falsely 'collectivising' the social sciences: each individual disci-
pline is characterised by a distinctiveness of underlying theoretical constructs and research
methodologies. Intrinsically different in detail but with no major language barriers inter-
vening, they tend to complement each other quite effectively.
What is it then that sets the economic sciences apart from the social sciences? Apart
from obvious differences of methodology and - for most social scientists, at least - the im-
penetrable language of econometrics, the key differences would appear to revolve around
their intellectual aspirations and their assumptions concerning human behaviour. From the
standpoint of a social scientist, fisheries economics is perceived as a clearly defined, well
structured but relatively narrow science which tends to abstract from the particularities and
contingencies of time and space. By contrast, the social sciences see themselves as very
much broader in outlook, concerned to understand the social, cultural and political contexts
within which management decisions are made. These specific contextual conditions influ-
ence not only the outcomes of management decisions but the very formulation of the
decisions in the first place.
But it is the underlying assumptions of the neo-classical paradigm of modern welfare
economics which drive the biggest wedge between the economic and social sciences. The
claims of value neutrality, the focus on self-interested rational behaviour of individual eco-
nomic actors and the belief in the role of competitive markets, real or simulated, which can
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optimise the allocation of resources in society, are all challenged by the postulates of the
social sciences (Jacobs, 1994). Economics is not a value neutral science: its persistent pri-
oritisation of economic efficiency is akin to the assertion of a particular value. The
assumptions of rational behaviour are not borne out by reality: within family firms, both in
farming and fishing, decisions are made by individuals with different perspectives and val-
ues, where the intrinsic values of independence and the strategies of entrenchment in the
quest for social and cultural survival compete with economic profitability to create the
bounded rationality of the satisficer. Competitive markets, as for example in quota trans-
fers, lead to an inequitable distribution of resources within society and even the claim for
economically efficient distribution can be questioned on the basis of evidence from Ice-
land. No wonder, then, that artisanal fishermen are concerned by the apparent drift of
opinion towards the privatisation of property rights in the corridors of power of many
European countries.
While the economic sciences attempt to explain how things should work out if the
social actors involved were to behave rationally, the social sciences explain why it is that
the social actors - individuals, organisations and agencies - will almost invariably appear to
behave irrationally and why the ideal world of economics is an illusion. To a degree, there-
fore, the social sciences attempt to counteract the time/space indifference of economic
science. They argue for the need to enter the real world of enormous social, cultural and
political complexity and to recognise the burden of history and geography.
The approaches of the economic and social sciences to management issues may also
be differentiated according to their choice of temporal and spatial scales. As a universalis-
ing science, economics will tend to focus on the large scale and to trivialise or ignore local
variations. By contrast, although aspiring to reach general conclusions, many of the social
sciences will be extremely sensitive to the significance of local variation. Paradoxically,
perhaps, the temporal preferences of the two groups are often reversed, with the economic
sciences more concerned with short term futures while the general thrust of the social sci-
ences is for a consideration of a longer term, intergenerational future. Just how well these
different perspectives mesh with those of the social actors involved in fisheries manage-
ment is an interesting question. The fishermen may share with the economists a
preoccupation with short term futures in respect of their strategic economic behaviour -
conditioned by the need to put food on the table today, to meet the demands of their bank
managers over repayment of loans on a monthly basis etc. But their social and cultural as-
pirations, in terms of the survival of the family enterprise, may well be intergenerational.
One of the problems of fisheries management lies in mediating between these differences
in time horizons.
While the economic sciences may lay claim to value neutrality, the same could never
be said of the social sciences which have become tainted with value laden perspectives and
popularly endowed with radical agendas. The social sciences may also lack the 'purity' of
the economic sciences as a result of a long standing 'common market' in theoretical con-
cepts and methodologies. My own discipline - human geography - is renowned for its
compulsive kleptomania in seeking to incorporate both social and economic theories into
its essentially spatial perspective. Most other social sciences, except perhaps anthropology,
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have shown a tendency towards eclecticism and plagiarism in pursuit of a more holistic
framework of explanation.
Economists will tend to feel uncomfortable if saddled with the more radical agendas
of their social science cousins. Most social scientists are, however, not so naive as to be-
lieve that their radical agendas will be incorporated into a new establishment position. But
they do believe that it is important to enliven the debate by challenging the establishment
position through the introduction of radical alternative projects in the hopes that these may
reveal weaknesses in the current system and lead, at least, to incremental change rather
than entrenchment of the status quo.
There has been a tendency for the social sciences to avoid engagement in the debates
over the optimal designs of regulatory tools, either individually or as a policy package,
while feeling free to comment critically upon the distributional effects of such measures.
The one major exception to this rule of disengagement has been the ITQ debate where a
fairly clear disciplinary division has emerged between the protagonists (economics) and
the antagonists (social services) principally over the merits of rational structures versus the
equitable distribution of resources.
Regulation theory
Within fisheries management the focus of research interest - consciously or unconsciously
- for both the economic and social sciences is the system of regulation. Three broad regu-
latory regimes can be identified (figure 2): state, market and social regulation - ideally
complementary, but potentially contrary forces. Whereas neo-classical economics is preoc-
cupied with the system of market regulation and its relationship to state regulation, the
attention of the social sciences is centred on the systems of social and state regulation and
their interactive behaviour.
Where fisheries have, in the past, suffered has been the overriding dominance of state
regulation, the instability of market forces and the weak and fragmented systems of social
regulation. One focus of attention for the social sciences in recent years has been the ways
in which alternative regulatory systems alter the position and balance of power between the
various social actors within the policy system. For many areas of policy making - but much
less so in the case of fisheries - recent trends have favoured a process of 'deregulation', in-
volving the partial surrender of the state's pre-eminent position and the contracting out of
management responsibilities to non-state institutions either in the market or the social sec-
tors (Symes, 1997). However, according to Ayres and Braithwaite (1992):
- 'we have not, and are not, experiencing an era of deregulation so much as an era of
regulatory flux - an era where dramatic regulatory, deregulatory and re-regulatory
shifts are occurring simultaneously'.
In fisheries, to date, such trends have not been particularly marked. Where they can
be observed, they have tended to favour increasing market regulation - as in the case of the
handful of states which have embraced an ITQ system of management - and the strength-
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ening roles of the processing and retail sectors, as in the Marine Stewardship Council proj-
ect which offers a more radical example of this regulatory shift.
The weakness of the system of social regulation has been exposed. According to Cox
et al (1985), the success of user group organisations within the policy community depends
on the degree to which they are capable of self-regulation and effective discipline over
their constituency. Doubts are raised over the capacity of user group organisations in the
fishing industry to manage the essential balance between the corporate and individual am-
bitions of their members and to maintain effective control over their behaviour (Phillipson,
1996; forthcoming). The fisheries sector has not so far been able to emulate the (former)
model of agriculture corporatism: in the UK, the National Farmers' Union (NFU) for long
enjoyed a special relationship with central government in policy making, whereas the Na-
tional Federation of Fishermen's Organisations has persistently grumbled at their exclusion
from the policy community and the lack of regular, meaningful consultations over policy
matters. Maybe their time will never come. The NFU has been increasingly marginalised,
first by the transfers of decision making from Whitehall to Brussels and, more recently, as
consumer and environmental interests have come to dominate the political agenda. The
same trends are evident in fisheries. Moreover, the formal fishermen's organisations are in-
creasingly being undermined by the challenge from more radical pressure groups operating
outside the formal policy process.
Regulatory dissonance, resulting from the interplay of the state, market and social
regulation systems, has become increasingly common within the fishing industry. It occurs
within state regulations (quota rules and discards), at the interface between state and mar-
ket regulation (black fish landings) and at the interface between state and social regulation
where there are pressures to disregard the formal rules in order to maintain the viability of
the social enterprise.
Theoretical contradictions
Although the regulatory model (figure 2) may suggest a partially overlapping set of re-
search interests, the separation of the economic and social sciences is intensified through
the distinctive theoretical approaches to regulation theory. Four different approaches can
be identified: the first two adhere to the economic sciences and the third and fourth to the
social sciences. The economic science approach would appear to have its origins in Har-
din's 1968 'tragedy of the commons' thesis in which common property resources are
portrayed as a 'free good', unanswerable to effective management - a thesis vigorously
contested by the social sciences (Berkes, et al, 1989).
A property rights approach has clearly made its impact in the field of fisheries eco-
nomics. Property rights are perceived as the central set of relationships defining the roles
of the state, the market and the individual in the allocation of scarce resources; and the pri-
vatisation of property rights is seen as the only way of ensuring that society is able to
optimise the use of scarce resources and that individuals can internalise the full costs of re-
source use. The property rights theory presumes that the only necessary action of
government in the management of resources assets is to assign property rights and estab-
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lish a free market for the exchange of those rights. Thereafter, the optimal allocation of
rights and 'management' of the resource will be assured by the operation of the market,
eliminating the need for further state intervention and greatly reducing the level of transac-
tion costs.
The neo-classical approach to resource management follows much the same ration-
ale, asserting that where natural resources are regarded as a 'free good' they will be
overexploited, degraded and depleted. The point of departure from the property rights
school of thought is that welfare economists are concerned to create hypothetical rather
than real markets and are committed to the use of a variety of interventionist instruments in
order to achieve the desired allocation of resources at any one point in time (Jacobs, 1994).
Both these approaches are essentially reductionist in style, relying upon rational eco-
nomic behaviour acting in a self-interested way to maximise the utility of the resource.
Several important aspects, including the role of institutional factors and the behavioural
characteristics of the principal social actors are disregarded and treated as exogenous to the
economic system (see figure 3). These 'exogenous variables' in their turn become the cen-
tral features of the social science approach, which focuses on the distortions of the
economists' rational world caused by socio-cultural and political processes. Political sci-
ence literature provides insights into the processes which transform the relationships
between state, market and social regulation, emphasising the role of institutions, policy
styles and processes of interest group mediation. The outcomes of policy making are inter-
preted as the result of power politics and both state and market regulation are seen as
susceptible to manipulation by powerful vested interests. Mediation of conflicting interests
will lead to sub-optimal, compromise 'solutions'. According to Jannicke (1990), inappro-
priate state intervention may perpetuate and deepen many of the world's environmental
problems. This 'state failure' thesis would surely include the handling of fisheries policy in
Europe and the apparent willingness on the part of the EU to condone, if not actually plan
for, 'sustainable overfishing' in Community waters.
Finally, the behavioural approach, adopted principally by social anthropologists, so-
ciologists and human geographers, examines in much greater detail the decision making
processes of the social actors in a search for greater understanding of why these actors do
not always behave 'rationally' i.e. in accordance with the assumptions of the regulators. In
terms of fisheries research, there has been relatively little emphasis on the internal social
structures of the 'family firm' and its external linkages or on the socially and culturally con-
strained decision making within these important micro-institutions. This dearth of
understanding is in marked contrast to the analogous situation in agricultural sociology
which boasts a copious literature on the sociology of the family farm and its complex deci-
sion making processes (see for example, Gasson and Errington, 1993). One potentially
fertile area for behavioural research in fisheries is an understanding of the human response
to the risks of resource depletion. 'Hazard response' research has indicated a tendency of
populations to return to the status quo ante following a natural disaster - to rebuild their
homes in earthquake zones and on active flood plains - largely based on their individual
perceptions of risk and their lack of knowledge of alternative options. In similar fashion,
we need to understand more thoroughly the reasons why fishermen continue to reject sci-
entific advice, to ignore their own empirical evidence of overfishing and to flout state
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regulation designed to protect them from further depletion of the resource base and the risk
of stock collapse. Simplistic 'explanations' rooted in the 'tragedy of the commons' thesis are
wholly inadequate.
Outlining an agenda for social science research
The second task of this paper is to outline some key elements of a social science agenda for
fisheries research and to comment, where appropriate, on their relevance to fisheries eco-
nomics. In many cases, the research topics will fall quite clearly within the area of discrete
concern for the social sciences; but in others they may be judged to occupy an area of
common ground shared with the economic sciences (Fig. 4). Initially, we can simply list
five key areas of social science research interest as:
- processes of social and cultural change within fishing communities, engendered by
global:local interactions and by the impacts of fisheries policy;
- definition of social objectives for fisheries policies;
- institutional restructuring;
- social outcomes of different property rights systems and management regimes and;
- socio-economic development of fisheries dependent areas.
Of these five areas, three are worthy of further elaboration in the context of the pres-
ent discussion: the social objectives for fisheries policy; institutional restructuring; and
fisheries dependent areas.
Social objectives
The 1991 Review of the Common Fisheries Policy (CEC, 1991) recognised that the social
parameters had been scarcely considered within the existing policy. This is not a problem
unique to the European Community. Social objectives tend to form a 'hidden agenda', un-
stated at the outset of the policy process but likely to be introduced covertly in the final
stages of decision making when the political acceptability of the policy proposal is as-
sessed. The absence of explicit social dimensions to fisheries policy becomes more crucial
as the social consequences of the policy become ever more acute. To date these problems
are viewed essentially as externalities to be dealt with by other policy areas rather than in-
ternalised within the fisheries policy itself. Thus, rather unlike agriculture policy which
commonly exhibits a strong concern for the social outcomes of its policy measures by pro-
viding special assistance to low income farmers and less favoured areas, fisheries policy is
seen essentially as an unalloyed economic policy. Part of the problem for the economist is
the incompatibility of social objectives - seen as subjective, value laden, political goals -
with the scientifically defined biological and economic objectives. Social objectives,
whether defined in terms of social recognition or social justice, are undoubtedly controver-
sial and problematic: they are complex, internally conflictive and usually difficult of
precise measurement - but they are not impossible to define, as the much vaunted Norwe-
gian fisheries policy demonstrates.
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Institutional restructuring
One of the conclusions from recent research in the social sciences is that the failure of fish-
eries management is due less to the content of fisheries policy than to the inappropriate
institutional frameworks within which the policy is formulated. Hanna's (1998) diagnosis
of the institutional pathologies of fisheries management on both sides of the Atlantic has
pointed to two particular problems: an unstable policy scope with inconsistent and poorly
defined objectives which renders fisheries policy susceptible to political manipulation, on
the one hand, and inert policy institutions which reduce the flexibility of response to the
changing conditions of the fisheries, on the other. Over the past decade or so, problems of
institutional restructuring have become a relatively well established area of social science
research developed around the analysis of policy process, definition of policy community
and the tendencies towards decentralisation and delegation of management powers and re-
sponsibilities, which have featured prominently in 'deregulation' strategies in other policy
areas. The concept of 'integrated fisheries management' (Svelle et al., 1997), in which the
objectives of ecosystem sustainability and marine wildlife conservation are integrated with
those of conventional fisheries management, provides an even more formidable challenge:
how to restructure the institutional frameworks in order to accommodate the new
stakeholders, their different scientific methodologies and their distinctive policy agendas
without risking information chaos and communicative dissonance.
Socio-economic development of fisheries dependent areas
The socio-economic analysis of fisheries dependent areas is not only a field of common
interest for the economic and social sciences but also, as the term 'socio-economic' would
seem to suggest, an area which favours a commonality of approach. The broad aims of
such a project are to define the structural characteristics, diversification strategies and in-
frastructural needs of these areas. To achieve this, a more closely defined set of objectives
is required, viz:
- to identify areas where fishing related activities assume a significant level of impor-
tance within the local/regional economy;
- to analyse the structural characteristics of such areas in terms of economic and social
factors;
- to assess the impacts of fisheries policies on the economic and social structures of
such areas;
- to evaluate the opportunities and constraints for diversification of fisheries dependent
areas, including inter alia the development and transfer of skills;
- to examine the role of economic and social institutions in the adaptation and diversi-
fication of fisheries dependent areas.
The term 'socio-economic analysis', which features quite frequently in the literature,
confers the impression of a convergence of methodology between the economic and social
sciences. But the term 'socio-economic' is one that I have come increasingly to distrust. It
is used widely in agricultural sociology where it has come to mean the ways in which so-
cial factors (the structural characteristics of farm households, division of labour, gender
and generational relations, social networks etc.) conspire to affect the economic perform-
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ance of the farm business. Clearly, in this case, the term has been hi-jacked by the social
sciences. By contrast, in fisheries, discussion of socio-economic factors has been left
mainly to the economists and the concept therefore has been simplified in terms of social
costs, income distribution and opportunity costs for labour, with a view to incorporating
such factors into the bio-economic model (Charles, 1988). In view of the risk of appropria-
tion of the term, it seems wiser to abandon it and to replace it with the less contentious
'social and economic analysis'.
Concern for the development of fisheries dependent areas - as a policy matter - is
quite recent. It was triggered in Europe by the series of Regional Socio-Economic Studies
in the Fisheries Sector, commissioned by the European Commission in 1991 and under-
taken principally by economists. From a social science standpoint, this was a somewhat
unpropitious start for the studies adopted an unambiguous, economics centred approach -
in line with their terms of reference - to the exclusion of the social variables. The result
was a useful, though narrowly constructed, geographical representation of the significance
of the fishing industry throughout the European Community.
Although, for some, concern for the development of fisheries dependent areas may
be something of a distraction from the central purpose of policy related research, it remains
a very relevant field of analysis for both the economic and social sciences. It should serve
to highlight the economic and social impacts of fisheries policy and help in constructing
appropriate social and regional policies for the amelioration of any adverse impacts, as
well as providing valuable data for the recalibration of the fisheries policy itself. As the so-
cio-economic studies made clear, there is a dearth of statistical data describing the
conditions in these areas; a prerequisite for the detailed analysis of fisheries dependent ar-
eas is the development of appropriate databases. In this connection, the continuing work of
LEI-DLO (Dol et al, 1996) and of ESSFiN (Otterstad et al, 1996) could point towards a
fruitful area of collaboration.
Conclusion
In so complex and dynamic a field as fisheries, no one discipline or school of thought can
claim intellectual hegemony. The question is not whether a multi-disciplinary approach is
appropriate, but in what form it should be promulgated in order to ensure that synergy
rather than dissonance is the outcome. The main thrust of this paper has been to demon-
strate that the economic and social sciences are distinct intellectual entities. While they
may share common interests, they are nonetheless separated by their purpose, philosophy
and methodology. This recognition of their separate intellectual identities and their distinc-
tive roles in policy related research is an essential prerequisite for successful collaboration.
Much was made earlier in the paper of the 'common market' that existed within the
social sciences. Disciplinary boundaries are, for the most part, no longer vigorously de-
fended; the social sciences share several paradigms, speak broadly the same language,
work with similar methodologies and combine a number of complementary skills. The
same cannot be said for the relationship between the economic and social sciences. But this
is not necessarily a barrier to meaningful collaboration. I am certainly not arguing that the
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boundaries between the economic and social sciences should be dissolved; but they should
become more permeable. Both groups of disciplines need to be more receptive to the ideas
originating outside their own disciplinary boundaries. This should not prove too much of a
problem for the social sciences already ensconced in the traditions of a 'common market' in
theoretical constructs and methodologies. It may be rather more of a challenge for the eco-
nomic sciences, especially where they are embedded in a reductionist approach.
The time is not quite right for a common, fully integrated research strategy embrac-
ing the economic and social sciences. The marriage, if there is to be one, needs to be
prefaced by a period of courtship during which each partner becomes more thoroughly
aquainted with - and tolerant of - the virtues and vices of the other. It must also be a 'mod-
ern marriage' based on equality rather than domination.
The collaborative model that I would favour is therefore not based on a spurious in-
tegration of research agendas but upon the pursuit of parallel trajectories in economic and
social research, the complementarity of research findings and the continuation of an inter-
active dialogue.
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The effect of individual quota on the catch composition of
the Dutch beamtrawl vessels.
Dr. W. Dol, LEI-DLO, The Netherlands
Part I: differences between the dutch beamtrawl fishery and dutch quota hoppers
The research presented in this report was carried out with financial support of the Dutch
Fisheries Producers Organisation (PV) under contract 97040.
The management of the Agricultural Economic Research Institute-DLO accepts no
responsibility for the follow-up damage as well as detriment originating from the applica-
tion of operational results or any other data acquired from the LEI-DLO from third party
risks in connection with this application.
Introduction
Often it is assumed that a decrease in the catch per unit effort (CPUE) is caused by a de-
crease in stock size. To secure a minimal stock size (MBAL) a decreasing CPUE should
lead to management actions (reduction of quota etc.). This is correct if fishermen would
- go to the same fishing areas as they did before;
- fish the same period of the year as they did in the years before;
- fish on the same species as they did before.
The pressure on the quota of one species could lead in a multi species fishery (e.g.
beamtrawling) to reactions of the fishermen in the sense that they shift their effort in time
and space and that they shift their target species. If this is the case, the CPUE gives a dis-
torted picture of the true catchability of the fish. For instance the last two years we have
seen that the quota of plaice is such that Dutch beamtrawl fishermen can easily catch their
plaice quotum, but are not able to fish their sole quota. This resulted in a shift in behaviour
of the Dutch fishermen in a sense that they target more on sole and shifted their effort to
locations (location and period) where the catch composition is in favour of sole. If fisher-
men start to target explicitly on sole the CPUE of plaice will be lower than if they would
fish as they did the year before. On the other hand the CPUE of sole would be higher as
expected. We also have observed that other species (i.e. dab, see figures 1a,b,c) have be-
come a more important part of the catch and that fishermen explicitly target on these
species. Targeting on other species results is lower CPUE's for plaice and sole. Since many
ICES advices are based on (relative changes in) the CPUE it is important to investigate the
magnitude of the problem stated above.
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Another problem is how the international effort is calculated. In many scientific cal-
culations the effort of several countries is added to get a total. Doing this to get a time
series there are two potential problems:
1. if the different countries would not change their fishing behaviour in the same way,
one can not add the effort of all the countries to get a total effort that can be com-
pared with effort data of other years;
2. if the target species would change over time it becomes more and more important to
be able to split the effort into effort on all the separate species. For example for the
beamtrawl fleet it would become important to be able to split the total effort in plaice
effort, sole effort, other species effort.
In this report there will be an comparison between Dutch beamtrawl fishermen and
Dutch quota hoppers. We use these groups since detailed data on catches and effort of
other countries are not available. Comparing these two groups, not only the magnitude of
the differences in CPUE is of interest. The differences between these two groups in time is
important, since these differences are an example to motivate the importance of the effort
problems as stated above and stresses the urgent need for effective methods to be able to
divide effort into effort targeting on a specie.
Method
To investigate the problems above one needs very detailed data. Since 1995 the Dutch
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature management and Fishery collects the logbooks of all the
vessels that land their fish in the Netherlands and store the complete logbook in a database
(called VIRIS: FIsh Registration and Information System). This data contains landings of
several quota species but also the ICES rectangles where fish is caught. Using the time
away from port and the assumption of constant CPUE when several rectangles are fished
during one trip, one can do effort and CPUE calculations on a trip/rectangle basis. Since
many Dutch quota hoppers land their fish in the Netherlands, the VIRIS database has the
detailed data we need to compare the CPUE of the Dutch beamtrawl fleet with the CPUE
of quota hoppers.
Using VIRIS some basic plaice and sole data of Dutch beamtrawlers and quota hop-
pers are presented in table 1. In table 2 some results are presented about the first half years
of 1995-1997. Table 3 gives some insight in catches and effort per HP-group. The tables
show enormous differences in CPUE between Dutch beamtrawlers and quota hoppers.
From table 2 we see that the Dutch beamtrawl effort is almost the same in 1997 as in 1996,
however the 1997 catches of plaice/sole are 18.53% resp. 40.75% less than in 1996. Quota
hoppers also have lower catches but to a lesser extent. In 1996 the quota hoppers applied
less effort than in 1995 but had higher plaice catches (11.14% more), this is in strong con-
trast with the Dutch beamtrawlers that saw decreasing catches with almost the same effort.
The CPUE depends on many factors, the most important ones are:
- fish stock sizes;
- vessel characteristics (i.e. engine power);
150
- period (in which month the effort is employed);
- location (in which ICES rectangle is fished);
- target species (plaice, sole or other...).
Since Dutch beamtrawlers and quota hoppers do not fish in the same area at the same
time of the year, we have to filter out the vessel, period, and location effects before we can
compare the two groups. This is done by estimating an ANOVA model. To limit the statis-
tical analysis so we would not get too many parameters that had to be estimated we
decided to look at two groups of vessels and limit the number of areas. When comparing
the CPUE in table 3 is looks sensible to do statistical analysis on two groups of vessels:
1. vessels with an engine of 300 HP or less (about 160 Dutch vessels and 30 quota hop-
pers);
2. vessels with an engine of more than 300 HP (about 210 Dutch vessels and 40 quota
hoppers).
One of the possible reasons for the difference between these two groups is the possi-
bility to switch to shrimp fishing (small vessels).
Looking at the CPUE per ICES rectangle during the year we decided to choose 7 ar-
eas. Figure 2 presents the 7 areas. In the case that a vessel visited two areas in the same trip
we took the whole catch and stored it into the area that had the highest catch (this is done
to decrease the number of outliers in the ANOVA model). As a measure for CPUE we took
the catch per day-at-sea, i.e. all the calculation are not done with HP-days and the days-at-
sea are based on the total time away from port (so including steam time, search time etc.).
In all the statistical analysis presented below data from 1 January 1995-30 June 1997 is
used.
The ANOVA model used in the statistical analysis is:
log CPUE = constant  +  1  log HP +   2ij   monthi*areaj  +   3ijk   flagi*monthj*yeark
with:
CPUE Catch of plaice or sole divided by days-at-sea
HP Engine power of the vessel
month January, February, ..., December
area areas as given by figure 2
flag has value 0 if it is a Dutch beamtrawler and 1 if it is a quota
hopper
log the natural logarithm (applied to give outliers less effect)
month*area the model is estimated for all months and all areas (12*7=84 co-
efficients)
flag*month*year all groups, all months, and all years (gives 72 coefficients
(2*12*3))
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The variable month*area represents the period- and location effect. The coefficients
of the flag*month*year variable indicate the differences in CPUE of Dutch beamtrawl ves-
sels and quota hoppers after filtering out the vessel, period, and location effect. Looking at
the differences of the coefficients of flag*month*year on can calculate the relative (per-
centual) differences in CPUE 1. These (relative) differences can be plotted and show how
the differences in time (i.e. January 1995-June 1997) are evolving.
The ANOVA model described above is estimated four times:
1. for plaice and for vessels with more than 300 HP);
2. for plaice and for vessels with 300 HP or less;
3. for sole and for vessels with more than 300 HP;
4. for sole and for vessels with 300 HP or less.
The results of the four ANOVA analysis are presented in the figures 3-14. For all of
the four models three figures are presented:
1. the relative difference between the CPUE of Dutch beamtrawlers and quota hoppers
for every month (January 1995-June 1997). If for a given month the difference is
+20% this should be translated to: the CPUE of Dutch fishermen after filtering out
the vessel, location, and period effect, is 20% higher than the CPUE of quota hop-
pers. A difference of -20% would indicate that quota hoppers have a 20% higher
CPUE as compared to Dutch beamtrawlers. NB.: we do not present the CPUE in any
of the three figures, we only show differences between CPUE;
2. to be able to see if the differences between CPUE is changing over time a figure of
the differences as compared to 1995 is presented. For example for January 1995 the
difference between Dutch beamtrawlers and quota hoppers is -11.94%, in January
1996 it is -17.07. This means that the difference in CPUE of Dutch beamtrawlers as
compared to quota hoppers has increased by 5.13%. A negative value in the second
figure hence indicates an increase in the relative difference of quota hoppers as com-
pared to Dutch beamtrawlers, or if you want a decrease in CPUE of Dutch
beamtrawlers as compared to quota hoppers;
3. the third figure is almost the same as the second figure, except that all changes are
weighted by the size of the difference of 1995. This is done to better compare differ-
ences in time, i.e. when the difference in already high in 1995 is will become less
dominant in the third figure.
                                                       
 Using a multiplicative model (taking the logarithme) the differences in the coefficients of -1 between the
Dutch beamtrawlers and quota hoppers means CPUE(NL)=exp(-1)CPUE(quota hopper), i.e. this means
CPUE(NL)=0.3678 CPUE(quota hopper) and hence there is a difference in the Dutch CPUE as compared
with the quota hoppers CPUE of 63.22%.
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Results for vessels with more than 300 HP
For plaice the differences in CPUE is always negative (figure 3), this indicates that the
CPUE of quota hoppers is always higher than for Dutch beamtrawlers. This is what one
would expect since quota hoppers do not have a large sole quotum and target more on
plaice than the Dutch beamtrawlers. Figure 6 shows that the CPUE of sole is always much
higher for Dutch beamtrawlers than for quota hoppers. This difference can be very large:
up to more than 300% and often more than 100%. The Dutch beamtrawlers clearly are ex-
perts in fishing sole. The figures 4 and 5 show an increase in the differences between the
CPUE of plaice in benefit of the quota hoppers. Only the months May 1996, June and July
1997 have a positive effect for the Dutch beamtrawlers, in a sense that the difference be-
tween quota hoppers and Dutch beamtrawlers has decreased but is still in favour of the
quota hoppers. For sole the figures 7 and 8 show that the differences in 1996 and 1997
have decreased (as compared to 1995), i.e. suggesting that the sole CPUE for quota hop-
pers have become better as compared to Dutch beamtrawlers. Only the months November
an December 1996 are extremely positive. This can be explained by the fact that at the end
of 1996 the Dutch quotum for plaice was full and fishermen were highly motivate to fish
on sole and perhaps also did some high grading of plaice (in a sense that those who would
get the highest price were landed).
After applying the ANOVA model the differences between Dutch beamtrawlers and
quota hoppers do not contain vessel, location and period effects. The difference can only
be explained by the target species or by high grading (applied by one group and not both).
The shift in target species can be explained by the problems one has with his quotum. A
good example is certainly the months November, December 1996 for plaice.
Since the relative plaice CPUE and sole CPUE have become better for quota hoppers
this suggest that Dutch beamtrawlers shift to other species (e.g. dab). Since dab is not a
quota species the landings can not be found in the logbooks and we can not apply an
ANOVA analysis as above on dab.
Results for vessels with 300HP or less
From figure 9 one can derive that the plaice CPUE for quota hoppers is always higher than
for Dutch beamtrawlers (only the month September 1996 the Dutch CPUE is higher). The
differences as compared to 1995 (figures 10 and 11) show that there is sometimes a posi-
tive and sometimes a negative effect but over the total period 1996-1997 there is a positive
effect, meaning that the CPUE of Dutch beamtrawlers has become better compared to the
quota hoppers. The question is wether this can be explained by the fact that the quota hop-
pers in Germany have since 1996 some catch restrictions in the plaice box.
Figure 12 shows that in the period January 1995 to May 1996 the sole CPUE for
quota hoppers is better than the CPUE of Dutch beamtrawlers. After May 1996 the CPUE
of Dutch beamtrawlers is better. The figures 13 and 14 show that the differences in CPUE
has become better for the Dutch fleet as compared to the quota hoppers.
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The results of the 300 HP or less group is opposite of the more than 300 HP group. It
looks as if the Dutch Eurocutter fleet performs a better job as compared to the quota hop-
pers. With the more than 300 HP group the quota hoppers perform better. Looking at the
results it is difficult to say if the Dutch Eurocutter fleet changed to other target species
(dab).
Conclusions and remarks
The differences in CPUE between Dutch beamtrawlers and quota hoppers is high, even if
one filters out the vessel, location and period effects the difference is still high and in-
creasing over the last few years. The increasing differences are the result of quota
restrictions that have more effect on the larger Dutch beamtrawlers than on the quota hop-
pers. This leads to effects like ''high grading'' and shifting effort to other target species. The
results of this report motivates further research how international effort should be calcu-
lated. Also one should be careful how to interpret the international effort time series since
the behaviour of Dutch beamtrawlers changed drastically the last 2.5 years. The possible
solution lies in splitting effort to effort on separate target species. A first attempt is pre-
sented in part II of this research: ''calculation of directed effort on plaice and sole''.
From the results presented above it is clear that fishermen change their behaviour due
to restrictions on their quota. This reaction does not take years and the magnitude of the re-
actions can be quit large (shifting location and target species).
This research is completely about CPUE. The differences in CPUE can by no mean
be directly translated into differences in income (costs and earnings). Further research is
needed if one is interested in the costs and earning effects due to decreasing quota on the
different groups of vessels.
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Table 1 Some plaice and sole statistics over the period 1995-1997
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Table 2 Some catch and effort data plaice and sole over the first half year of 1995-1997
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Table 3 Some plaice and sole statistics per HP-groups over the period 1995-1996
Catch plaice Netherlands Catch plaice Quota hoppers
HP-group 1995 1996 %growth HP-group 1995 1996 %growth
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 -  100 HP 5 7408 148060.00 * 1 -  100 HP 0 0
151 -  200 HP 606 0 -100.00 151 -  200 HP 0 0
201 -  260 HP 12399 21510 73.48 201 -  260 HP 0 0
261 -  300 HP 1943219 1875265 -3.50 261 -  300 HP 2921546 2454345 -15.99 *
301 -  400 HP 38 73 92.11 * 301 -  400 HP 0 0
401 -  600 HP 8766 1433 -83.65 401 -  600 HP 0 0
601 -  800 HP 272441 86704 -68.18 601 -  800 HP 320699 412205 28.53
801 - 1100 HP 483816 353106 -27.02 801 - 1100 HP 755340 1006438 33.24
1101 - 1300 HP 1213497 783596 -35.43 1101 - 1300 HP 1648638 1709295 3.68
1301 - 1500 HP 1024272 420532 -58.94 1301 - 1500 HP 2342404 2355394 0.55
1501 - 2000 HP 21928808 17674820 -19.40 1501 - 2000 HP 3776979 4038509 6.92
2000 + HP 17212623 13981638 -18.77 2000 + HP 1770137 2609309 47.41
Ef fort Netherlands Ef fort Quota hoppers
HP-group 1995 1996 %growth HP-group 1995 1996 %growth
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 -  100 HP 61 4063 6560.66 * 1 -  100 HP 0 0
151 -  200 HP 7012 0 -100.00 151 -  200 HP 0 0
201 -  260 HP 38834 35740 -7.97 201 -  260 HP 0 0
261 -  300 HP 2601524 2331442 -10.38 261 -  300 HP 1262582 1085342 -14.04
301 -  400 HP 1400 7610 443.57 * 301 -  400 HP 0 0
401 -  600 HP 75531 57802 -23.47 401 -  600 HP 0 0
601 -  800 HP 293288 158800 -45.86 601 -  800 HP 166700 160567 -3.68
801 - 1100 HP 770287 526401 -31.66 801 - 1100 HP 715498 669117 -6.48
1101 - 1300 HP 2112604 1367264 -35.28 1101 - 1300 HP 1656854 1609862 -2.84
1301 - 1500 HP 1915239 737427 -61.50 1301 - 1500 HP 2321480 1920066 -17.29
1501 - 2000 HP 37716631 31626927 -16.15 1501 - 2000 HP 4326474 3976464 -8.09
2000 + HP 38861393 34050780 -12.38 2000 + HP 2353901 3008249 27.80 ***
CPUE plaice Netherlands CPUE plaice Quota hoppers
HP-group 1995 1996 %growth HP-group 1995 1996 %growth
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 -  100 HP 0.0819672 1.823283 2124.41 1 -  100 HP
151 -  200 HP 0.0864233 0 0.00 151 -  200 HP
201 -  260 HP 0.3192821 0.601847 88.50 201 -  260 HP
261 -  300 HP 0.7469541 0.804337 7.68 261 -  300 HP 2.3139455497 2.2613563282 -2.27
301 -  400 HP 0.0271429 0.009593 -64.66 301 -  400 HP
401 -  600 HP 0.1160583 0.024792 -78.64 401 -  600 HP
601 -  800 HP 0.9289197 0.545995 -41.22 601 -  800 HP 1.9238092382 2.5671837924 33.44
801 - 1100 HP 0.6280984 0.670793 6.80 801 - 1100 HP 1.0556842926 1.5041285754 42.48
1101 - 1300 HP 0.5744082 0.573112 -0.23 1101 - 1300 HP 0.9950412046 1.0617649215 6.71
1301 - 1500 HP 0.5348011 0.570269 6.63 1301 - 1500 HP 1.0090132157 1.2267255396 21.58
1501 - 2000 HP 0.5814095 0.558854 -3.88 1501 - 2000 HP 0.8729924183 1.0156030584 16.34
2000 + HP 0.4429235 0.410611 -7.30 2000 + HP 0.7520014648 0.867384648 15.34
